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Introduction: Religion and “Business”
A cursory examination of literature shows that religion and business are 
historically intertwined, with particular effects on society. It is widely 
acknowledged, for instance, that religious church and mission organisa-
tions have traditionally blended social purpose with their proselytisation 
to pursue holistic transformation in the societies they serve (cf. Samuel 
and Sugden 1999). Alongside Max Weber’s accounts of Calvinist Protes-
tant values driving the entrepreneurial spirit toward the development of 
capitalist economies, Spear (2010) also writes about strong mutual trust 
in Quaker groups that was historically harnessed for entrepreneurial pur-
suits, transcending the religious domain. Traditional Islamic practices of 
zakat (the annual donation of a percentage of one’s income to religious 
institutions), while being charitable, have also historically supported busi-
ness, because mosques have always provided facilities for traders (Ahmed 
1999). Additionally, interest-free Islamic finance, which is as old as the 
religion itself, is traditionally viewed as a means to support social and 
economic development, premised on long-term, ethical relations between 
local financiers and business (Ahmed 1999: 58). Meanwhile, Buddhist 
economics (arising from “Right Livelihood”, a component of the “Noble 
Eightfold Path”) targets systemic economic issues by promoting balanced 
consumption, frugality and rewarding vocation (Mendis 1994: 196–9), 
and it has become a basis for reinvesting resources into communities and 
fostering resilience (van Willenswaard 2015).
Since the business/religion relationship is strongly driven by ethos, this 
relationship appears as an interesting and relevant issue in the case of 
social enterprises (hereafter SEs), which are value-driven initiatives. This 
chapter takes a look at the influence of religion on SEs in East Asia—
the most religiously diverse region of the world (Pew Research Center 
2014). We start by analysing the influence of religion on international 
development discourse in recent decades, considering that major inter-
national development institutions have increasingly embraced SE as part 
of “sustainable development” (Power et al. 2012). We then narrow the 
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discussion to nuanced specificities by considering institutional perspec-
tives, finding value in a text by James (1993) as the basis for a theoretical 
framework. We proceed with a presentation of the research that was car-
ried out, including a summary of the methodology used, before describ-
ing three case studies that illustrate the influence of different religions on 
SEs: Christian Protestant influence, in South Korea; Islamic influence, in 
Malaysia; and Buddhist influence, in Cambodia. Our specific research 
questions are:
How does the institutional influence of religion impact on social 
enterprises’ strategies for successfully achieving social goals and 
organisational sustainability? And how is this affected in turn by 
variations in religious heterogeneity and national income status?
Our findings (which challenge, to some extent, Estelle James’ conclusions) 
are that a wider range of dependent variables than religious heterogene-
ity and level of economic development need to be considered in order to 
identify the strategies of faith-based SEs and the reasons why religious 
organisations engage in social entrepreneurship. Religious conservatism 
is just as significant as heterogeneity, for instance, while religious organi-
sations in communities recovering from trauma in a low-income country 
may prioritise the renewal of faith alongside the need to provide services.
1.  The Significance of Religion in “Development” and 
the “Social Economy”
In general, all religions encourage engagement in society, and this is rec-
ognised as a force for societal development because it harnesses moral 
imperatives, pro-social motives and shared values towards tackling pov-
erty and social exclusion (Martin et al. 2007).1 Moreover, in the process 
of making development programmes actually work, it is argued that peo-
ple’s spiritual and physical needs often have to be viewed interconnect-
edly, not least because faith is a lens through which many of the world’s 
poor understand their poverty (Bradley 2009). Quite simply, religion can-
not be ignored as a developmental force, because of its outreach and the 
extensive resources that it mobilises (Deneulin 2013). Consequentially, 
from the mid-1990s onward, international development institutions, in 
pursuit of new avenues for effectiveness, turned (albeit quite briefly) from 
secular postures towards “dialogue” with faith organisations; such evo-
lution culminated in the “World Faiths Development Dialogue” (WFDD) 
(Haynes 2013).2 Reciprocally, traditional religious worldviews across 
continents have been broadened by the pursuit of new practical applica-
tions of religious texts, promoting new institutional logics that encourage 
entrepreneurship and receptiveness to partnerships (Ataide 2012; Evers 
and Laville 2004). Accordingly, faith-based work in the social economy 
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is a contemporary illustration of the way in which religious influence 
extends beyond the place of worship to embrace the whole of human life 
(Biscotti and Biggart 2014). Notably, while studies find the influence of 
religion on general entrepreneurship not to be very significant, according 
to Keynes (2007, cited in Ataide 2012: 179) “religious sects continue to 
motivate, and provide strong links to legitimacy and resources for social 
entrepreneurs”.
2.  Religion and SEs Viewed From Institutional 
Perspectives
Existing literature on the complex institutional context facing faith-based 
SE focuses largely on issues of legitimacy (Ataide 2012; Spear 2010). 
Legitimacy, succinctly put, is an important resource for SEs, which helps 
them attract various other resources from supportive actors. Sometimes, 
legitimacy can allow enterprises to obtain different kinds of state sub-
sidies; however, according to James (1993), religious enterprises are 
supposedly more concerned with recruiting more followers than with 
obtaining tax subsidies and similar resources. This is not to say that legit-
imacy as a means to acquire resources is not important for religiously 
influenced SEs, but it does suggest that the meaning of legitimacy and 
“legitimacy-seeking behaviours” enacted for instance through institution 
building and stakeholder engagement (Mason et al. 2007) are all quite 
specific.
Arguably, the way in which religion impacts institutional development 
in terms of justifications for existence, perceived roles and particular 
status as cultural symbols or icons is more visible from socially con-
structed perspectives (Ataide 2012: 193). Supportive literature defines 
“institutional logics” as “the socially constructed, historical patterns 
of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence” (Thorn-
ton and Ocasio 1999: 804). Following social constructivist ontology, 
at the nexus of religion and enterprise, one finds faith-driven social 
entrepreneurship, influencing cultural change within social institutions. 
This drive toward cultural change is born from the desire to seek out 
fundamental (or “innovative”) changes, as opposed to piecemeal ones. 
Combining enterprise and religion is for example seen as a way to tar-
get “human capabilities”, improving people’s freedom and promoting 
social change in the process (Mugabi 2003). This has been internation-
ally popularised by “Business As Mission” (BAM), a form of social busi-
ness serving as a strategy for missionary evangelising via market-driven 
mission/job creation and the creation of social value (Borquist and de 
Bruin 2016). In theory, such missionary work is suited to entrepreneur-
ship because it provides more autonomy for practitioners than non-
governmental organisations, which rely on international aid (Bradley 
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2009). However, the fact that BAM is bound in a specific Christian 
culture and practised dominantly (to date) by expatriate missionaries 
in low-income countries (Bradley 2009:  229) underlines a point that 
has long been clear: entrepreneurship is generally “culture-bound”, and 
universal frameworks are not very useful from an analytical point of 
view (Dana and Dana 2005: 81). In contrast to BAM, for instance, from 
an Islamic perspective, SEs in today’s world might be seen as “interme-
diary institutions” that add more innovation to the practice of zakat 
and enhance its social value through strategies to empower the poor 
(Mulyaningsih and Ramadani 2017).
In summary, from a socially constructed perspective, regardless of the 
global outreach of well-financed models of religion-influenced enterprise,3 
there is reason to believe that combinations of nationally embedded influ-
ences will promote or inspire different strategies for gaining legitimacy 
among religious social enterprises with more local origins.
A hypothetical differentiation of institutional context and legitimacy 
for SE in accordance with religious influence is provided by James (1993), 
who evaluates the private-public mix of education provision across dif-
ferent countries. James finds that in low-income countries, demand for 
non-state services is quite simply driven by meagre public budgets. In 
countries that have achieved a certain level of economic development, 
the demand for and supply of education by non-profit organisations 
is driven by cultural and religious heterogeneity. On the demand side, 
consumers with specific tastes may choose a denominational non-state 
provider. Meanwhile, in a competitive, multi-denominational context, 
the supply side is driven by the desire of religious denominations to 
attract followers. In such contexts, extending activities from the place 
of worship into public-service provision is a defensive strategy, enacted 
to maintain or increase the congregation. The potential market return 
is less of a concern than for conventional business, given that differ-
ent resources (including gifts and volunteering) can be mobilised to 
reduce costs. In summary, according to James, “founders are interested 
in maximising faith rather than pecuniary profits” (James 1993: 577).
James’ analysis provides a good hypothetical platform for analys-
ing SE in East Asia, where the level of economic development and the 
extent of cultural and religious heterogeneity vary considerably among 
countries. In this book chapter, we compare cases in the Republic of 
Korea (hereafter “South Korea”), a “high-income” country; in Malay-
sia, an “upper-middle-income” country; and in Cambodia, a “lower-
middle-income” country (that was, until mid-2016, a “low-income” 
country), according to World Bank (2017) measurements. South Korea 
and Malaysia can be historically considered as religiously heterogene-
ous nations, while Cambodia is one of the most religiously homogenous 
nations in East Asia.
Religious Influences on SE in Asia 297
3.  Research Presentation
3.1.  Relevance of the Research Question
Institutional logics perspectives help to examine tensions within hybrid 
organisations, which necessarily embrace conflicting logics (Battilana 
and Lee 2014). In the earlier respect, taking into account religious log-
ics further expands the range of logics to be examined. This could also 
undermine to some extent the notion that the institutional logics of pri-
vate benefit and social good are incompatible, by depicting this hybridity 
as a natural state when situated in a particular (i.e. religious) context. In 
the recent development of institutional logics perspectives, further inves-
tigation of the logic of religion has also been called for in relation to 
“inter-institutional systems” constituted by markets, bureaucracies, com-
munities, professional associations, family and church (Tracey 2012). It 
is thus certainly of academic interest to examine how different forms 
of organisation have traditionally engaged with religious logic and how 
this is changing in the world today. For example, faith-driven business 
in Europe and Latin America has a long and well-documented history 
of combining the logics of markets with religion (Spear 2010: 39–42). 
However, to date, most examples of religious influences on enterprise 
have been drawn from outside of Asia. With a view to exploring these 
influences in markedly distinct entrepreneurial environments (cf. Dana 
1999), this chapter examines three cases of faith-based SE, respectively in 
South Korea, Malaysia and Cambodia.
3.2.  Methodology
Our central objective is to draw out contextualised theoretical implica-
tions of religious influence on SEs. We pay particular attention to embed-
dedness in the national institutional context of religion. In Cambodia 
and Malaysia, for instance, we would not be inclined to analyse BAM, 
regardless of its profile, because the national religious context is not 
highly supportive of Christianity and we thus instead choose to respec-
tively analyse one social enterprise influenced by Buddhism and another 
influenced by Islam. We are also concerned with narratives that underpin 
the social enterprise’s sense of identity and the basis for its relationship 
with employees and/or beneficiaries; following Moss et al. (2011: 806), 
we accordingly pay attention to mission statements, while being aware 
that such material cannot be taken at face value. For the purpose of this 
paper, we opt for an exploratory case study approach because of the lack 
of existing comparative studies of SE in Asia from a religious perspec-
tive. Given that SE is always situated in context, emerging in response to 
particular and varied challenges, it is also suitable to investigate specific 
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enterprises in detail, in order to draw out and interpret underlying issues 
in each case, including how these enterprises mobilise support and 
resources. In summary, the limits of generalisation from case studies are 
offset by the depth of understanding that they generate.
3.3.  Cases Studied
South Korea and the Loving Line Empathy Shops
South Korea has vigorous religious traditions. Historically, Buddhism 
and Confucianism have influenced Korean society and culture since the 
time of the Baekje Kingdom (57 BC) (Hong 1980). In post-war Korea, 
Mahāyānist Buddhism was the largest religion for 30 years, but it has 
recently been overtaken by Protestant Christianity, which, according 
to Kim (2000), has expanded ever since its introduction in 1884 by 
American Protestant missionaries. This author writes that “the number 
of Protestant Christians [in South Korea] has increased faster than in 
any other country in Asia” (Kim 2000: 117). According to the Korean 
Statistical Information Service (2015), roughly 44% of the population 
identify with a religion: 19.7% identify as Protestant Christians; 15.5%, 
as Mahāyānist Buddhists; and 7.9%, as Catholic Christians. Since 2011, 
the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA) has worked 
with Buddhist, Protestant and Catholic SE support organisations. These 
include the “Christianity Social Enterprise Support Centre” (CSESC), 
established by numerous Protestant Christianity Churches and NGOs. 
CESC has initiated SE academies and forums and helped to establish SEs 
by purchasing products and providing practical support and resources, 
with the explicit aim of propagating religion through activities (CSESC 
2017; Ministry of Employment and Labour 2017). In this context, the 
case study chosen—namely the “Loving Line Empathy Shops”—is of 
interest for exploring SE in an advanced institutional context, where 
levels of economic development and cultural and religious heterogeneity 
provide a strong basis for testing James’ (1993) hypotheses pertaining 
to competitive congregation building. Beyond this, there is also fertile 
ground for analysis of hybrid institutional logics and responding to the 
call for research on the way religious organisations take shape within 
“inter-institutional systems” (Tracey 2012).
The first Loving Line Empathy Shop was established in South Korea in 
2002, in partnership with Onnuri Church.4 Loving Line adheres to “the 
ministry of community movement and love which will enable people to 
have empathy, beyond sympathy, toward neighbours”. It is also men-
tioned that the Empathy Shop “draws a biblical economic model which 
transforms a polarised capitalism to community capitalism and revives 
the community economy”.5
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Empathy Shops are similar to charity shops; they collect second-hand 
or stocked items at lower prices and resell them at a profit. One hundred 
percent of profit is donated to social projects helping vulnerable people in 
South Korea and other countries. In the first instance, the establishment 
provided assistance to a project run by a Swiss woman who sent Mon-
golian quilts to North Korea to help people who struggled to cope with 
the cold weather. A  group from the Onnuri Church organised charity 
bazaars, and their success led to the first Empathy Shop officially open-
ing on Onnuri Church premises in 2003 (Shim 2009). The Church also 
offers human resources. The Onnuri Church is one of biggest Protestant 
churches in South Korea, and the Empathy Shop has benefited from the 
support of this church’s volunteers. Some members of the church volun-
teered to design the logo and poster, and to decorate the interior of the 
shop. After the opening the shop, church members also volunteered to 
run the shop, cleaning and selling the items.
Nowadays, Loving Line has physical shops in Seoul and an online 
shop.6 The enterprise receives a 25% commission on sales, which is 
used to support community-based social entrepreneurs. The focus is not 
on providing social services directly, but instead on supporting service 
providers through finance and better networks (Shim 2009). Moreover, 
revenues support study groups on “community capitalism”. Shim et al. 
(2008) define community capitalism as “an economic system which puts 
sharing into action through innovative business activities”, while the 
Onnuri Church expresses that it embodies “a puritan ethic which empha-
sises that the sanctity of labour and occupations are callings from God”.7
The Loving Line Empathy Shops are not a government-certified SE in 
South Korea. The founder, Dr. Sang-dal Shim, did not even realise that 
their activities could be considered as SE activities in the manner that 
government legislation describes. He started the first Empathy Shop “just 
to help people” (Interview, June 1, 2014) and realised only later that such 
initiatives could be referred to as “social enterprise”.
Dr. Sang-dal Shim views a social enterprise as an organisation which 
practices community capitalism by helping the neighbours, with good will 
or/and empathy, regardless of its certification. Furthermore, legitimacy is 
derived less from religious beliefs than it is from market forces. Loving 
Line has innovated and modernised its stores and online sales in response 
to customer preferences. This has involved retailing partnerships with the 
private sector, and one of the central factors for Loving Line’s success has 
been challenging stereotypical views about Empathy Shops as retailers of 
cheap, inferior and second-hand goods (Shim 2009: 49). The case of the 
Empathy Shops is meaningful because it is legitimated by sound business 
principles applied to religious values, thus belying the notion that reli-
gious organisations should not have economic objectives. The founder 
of the Empathy Shops mentions that they “had to convince members of 
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the Church that social entrepreneurial activities [could] help the Church 
do its social role—helping the neighbours” (Interview, June 2014). Lov-
ing Line also clearly acknowledges that churches have good resources 
for social entrepreneurial activities, such as facilities, volunteers and net-
works of church members.
In summary, although the government’s institutional influences are 
powerful in South Korea, the Loving Line has defined its organisational 
form and activities based on its own understandings, rather than being 
“co-opted” by the certification system. For the Loving Line Empathy 
Shops, working with people who have a similar sense of mission is more 
important than benefiting from subsidies. Sustaining the Empathy Shops 
without relying on government subsidies for certified social enterprises 
was possible not only because the founding members strongly believed in 
people’s empathy for each other, but also because they identified and used 
the potential of the Church itself as a powerful source of resources—
access to big markets, volunteers and member networks.
Malaysia and the Baitul Fiqh Welfare Home
Malaysia is historically a multi-cultural, religiously plural nation. Islam 
was brought to Malaysia in the 13th century by Sufis and traders. While 
the country was predominantly Muslim by the 15th century, Muslim 
Malays coexisted with Buddhist and Hindu influences (Abdul Hamid 
2013; Camilleri 2013). The equilibrium was disrupted by British colonial 
rule, in the 19th and 20th century, when the introduction of Chinese 
and Indian migrants into mines and rubber plantations fostered cultural 
and religious cleavages, while Christianity was strengthened (Camilleri 
2013:  226–7). Today 60% of the Malaysian population are Muslims, 
19% are Buddhist (dominantly Mahāyānist), 9% are Christians and 6% 
are Hindus (Yaacob 2011: 167). Scholars observe that moderate Islam 
and the culture of religious dialogue have recently been displaced by a 
conservative “One Malaysia” discourse, indicating a rise in “religious 
nationalism” in place of ethnic nationalism (Abdul Hamid 2013: 14–15; 
Camilleri 2013:  236). Nonetheless, Malaysia is a religiously heteroge-
neous country, where the level of economic development allows people 
choices. In such contexts, James (1993) expresses that competitive aspects 
of recruiting followers constitute the main driver of religious non-profit 
service provision. What is of interest here is to consider whether religious 
conservatism, specific social demographics being catered for and the types 
of services that a social enterprise offers are variables to be considered 
alongside competition. Indeed, it is also worth considering whether there 
are circumstances where the type of competitive congregation-seeking 
activities that James brings attention to cease to be applicable at all.
Baitul Fiqh Welfare Home (BFWH) is an NGO set up in 2005 to provide 
shelter for Muslim women in need. Baitul Fiqh means “house of Islamic 
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jurisprudence”. Since its incorporation, BFWH has helped to deliver over 
300 babies of unwed mothers, sheltered more than 700 abused women 
and found homes for over 300 abandoned adolescent women. BFWH 
also operates a food bank and weekly soup kitchen for the homeless. The 
founder of BFWH, Haliza Abd Halim, previously worked for a Christian 
NGO serving vulnerable pregnant women; a referral to deliver a Muslim 
baby and the realisation of the lack of Muslim NGOs in this field gave 
her the impetus to launch BFWH (Tho 2009). Baitul Fiqh SE sells the 
cakes and cookies which it bakes, generating sufficient income to pay 
for the rental of the shelter premises operated by the organisation. The 
baking programme started because a volunteer chef taught staff baking 
skills. Baitul Fiqh also sold second-hand goods, as well as toys donated 
as gifts in kind by large companies, but it stopped this activity due to lack 
of manpower.
The religious belief underpinning BFWH’s commercial activities is 
that working to get one’s funding is better than asking others for money. 
However, the organisation’s main source of revenue is still grants and 
donations from corporations, individuals and mosques—although con-
tributions from the latter are not significant, compared to donations 
overall. As far as human capital is concerned, the NGO relies both on 
paid staff and volunteers. One challenge BFWH faces, when seeking to 
raise donations and attract Muslim volunteers, is the fact that its social 
mission is often perceived negatively. Some Muslims sense that help-
ing BFWH beneficiaries means condoning pregnancy out of wedlock or 
entails risks of becoming religiously corrupted by sinful acts that hinder 
one’s personal progress to paradise. At the institutional level, mosques 
are less keen to donate because their giving is usually allocated to pur-
poses traditionally prescribed for zakat contributions, such as support to 
religious schools, the poor and needy (Nadzri et al. 2012). However, the 
founder does report one sermon where the local Imam said that Baitul 
Fiqh served a good cause and encouraged Islamic devotees to help. There 
has been no other notable religious institutional assistance, except for 
guidance from officers of the Ministry of Furtherance of Islam in Malay-
sia (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, or JAKIM) relating to accept-
able practices and procedures in events such as deaths of beneficiaries or 
divorce.
In order to achieve its organisational goals, BFWH embeds the Mus-
lim faith in its key avenues of work with beneficiaries. Counselling and 
group support are based on Muslim principles and, on a daily basis, ben-
eficiaries communally participate in the five Muslim prayers, with core 
messages relating to repentance and kindness to others. In its external 
communication, the organisation incorporates Muslim sayings. Accord-
ing to online information, BFWH was established to “create and admin-
istrate a custody or protection centre for teenage girls who were involved 
in social ills, and help poor single mothers, orphans, potential converts, 
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and those who have fallen away from the faith”.8 The founder considers 
that it was her family (rather than the mosque) that had the most decisive 
religious influence on her initiative. For instance, it was her father, rather 
than the Imam, who told her not to charge beneficiaries for the assis-
tance offered. Her immediate family does not hold positions in mosques; 
however, her great-grand-father played an important religious role in the 
state, while her cousins completed Islamic studies overseas to become 
Ustaz (or “religious scholars”). She occasionally asks these cousins for 
religious advice and clarification about Islamic principles.
BTWH committee members are all Muslims, and some of them are 
religious scholars. However, the organisation is not spiritually accounta-
ble to any formal religious institution. In terms of governance, the organ-
isation is administratively accountable to the police, welfare department 
and Muslim religion council as far as its social work is concerned. In 
terms of external assistance, the organisation works with government 
agencies as well as with NGOs (by cross-referring cases) of other faiths. It 
seems that formal accountability to other stakeholders in the community, 
including service users, is not high. There are no formal mechanisms in 
place for giving them a role in decision making either. The founder justi-
fies this on the basis that, in the past, committee members in the com-
munity have tried to push their own agendas rather than supporting the 
organisation or the causes it pursues. The founder of Baitul Fiqh Welfare 
Home considers the organisation to be accountable by demonstrating 
success according to two criteria: first, the sustainable operation of the 
organisation, so that beneficiaries can have successful stories, such as 
being integrated back into society with jobs and continuing to practise 
Islam; secondly, the absence of negative views held against the organisa-
tion itself. These criteria or signs of success are related to the founder’s 
belief that Allah will continue to guide the organisation.
This case is meaningful for three reasons. First, the central religious 
influence in this case comes from the founder’s family rather than from 
formal institutions, such as mosques. Her immediate and extended fam-
ily, rather than societal expectations, serves as a religious compass. As a 
consequence, compared to other religiously affiliated organisations, she 
enjoys greater freedom to pursue specific social needs; this also creates 
more avenues for social innovation and entrepreneurship. However, a 
deterring factor is the lack of human capital. Secondly, obtaining the 
support of religious clerics is not easy, because of the stigmatisation of 
the beneficiaries, who are often considered as the victims of their own 
sinful acts. In this regard, the support of fellow organisations in the same 
sector was important in the initial stage. Thirdly, there is cross-assistance 
between the organisation and NGOs of other religions; cooperation is 
thus not limited to enterprises of the same faith. The importance of serv-
ing beneficiaries is thus prioritised over religious affiliation.
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Cambodia and Buddhism for Social Development Action
It is thought that Indian migration brought Khmers (the majority Cam-
bodian ethnic group) into contact with Buddhism in the 5th century 
(Harris 2008: 4–5). Mahāyānist Buddhism was widely mixed with Hin-
duism by the 10th century (Harris 2008: 17–18). By the 14th century, 
most Khmers had adopted Theravāda Buddhism, mainly via interaction 
with inhabitants of the Thai central plain, although travelling Burmese 
and Ceylonese missionaries also played a role (Chandler 2008: 81). In 
the late 20th century, Cambodia was notoriously engulfed in successive 
conflicts and traumas, including the Maoist Khmer Rouge period, when 
religious institutions were annihilated.9 However, Theravāda Buddhism 
has proven remarkably resilient. Today, 95% of the Cambodian pop-
ulation are Theravāda Buddhists, while less than 3% are Cham Mus-
lims and Christianity is practiced by less than 2% of Cambodians (Peou 
2017:  36–37). Religious heterogeneity in Cambodia is thus compara-
tively low. The case study of a Theravāda SE that follows is interesting 
to the extent that, following James’ (1993) analysis, the question remains 
open of whether recruiting followers is significant or whether (given the 
relatively low level of economic development) more immediate necessi-
ties, related to deficits in services, tend to take precedence.
Buddhism for Social Development Action (BSDA) is a community 
development NGO based in Kampong Cham Province, in Eastern 
Cambodia; it was established in 2005 by seven monks using their own 
resources. In 2007, BSDA gained funding for a project supported by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and it has since expanded 
with aid-funded programmes/projects addressing health, HIV/AIDS, 
youth empowerment, vocational training and children’s education. BSDA 
uses land and buildings owned by the local pagoda (Wat Nokor Bachaey) 
to run some activities. BSDA has also integrated SEs into its programmes, 
including:
• the SMILE vocational training restaurant—a work integration enter-
prise initiated in 2009 with US$10,000 of capital contributed by 
BSDA’s largest donor (EcoSolidar, an International NGO which is 
based in Switzerland). SMILE provides vocational training for fifteen 
youth at a time. It attracts tourists in Kampong Cham and is the 
principal outlet for BSDA’s weaving enterprise, which manufactures 
traditional Cambodian scarves (kroma). Twenty percent of profits go 
to BSDA’s social programmes;
• the Angkor Language School (ALS), which teaches English and Chi-
nese each evening, using local school facilities. ALS grew by mobilis-
ing volunteer teachers (including monks). Fees vary between US$1.5 
and US$3 per month. Net profits are marginal, but ALS sustainably 
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provides affordable language tuition to more than 600 children and 
young adults from surrounding villages and creates part-time work 
for 20 teachers;
• the BSDA traditional dance enterprise, which enables children from 
poor families to gain incomes by performing for tourists and at local 
weddings and festivities. Seventy percent of revenues are shared 
among performers to sustain their school attendance. The enterprise 
is run in the spirit of boosting children’s confidence and pride in 
Cambodian culture, and teaching solidarity.
As far as the founding narrative of Buddhism for Social Development 
Action is concerned, the text in BSDA’s promotional documents (includ-
ing every Annual Report between 2011 and 2015) and on BSDA’s website 
(www.bsda-cambodia.org/who-we-are/) is worth quoting:
The community felt that monks would preach altruism in theory but 
hardly ever practice it. Deeply hurt, seven monks founded the organi-
sation, financing it privately throughout the first three years until their 
work was noticed and international donors started to provide funding.
The first element of this foundational narrative concerns Buddhism as 
a force for mutual assistance, intertwined with restoring the reputa-
tion of Buddhist monks. In interviews with five remaining founding 
members in 2013, these same concerns arose prominently. The chief 
executive explained: “We wanted a holistic approach. Income was not 
important, we wanted to provide training and promote accountability”. 
This is echoed in strategic plans, which feature consistent emphasis on 
the Buddhist principle of Mettā—the cultivation of boundless, selfless 
love and compassion, as opposed to friendliness based on self-interest. 
Mettā is commensurate with self-sacrifice, and here the second element in 
BSDA’s foundational narrative emerges: a period of self-sacrifice, when 
the monks financed work with their own small resources (mostly money 
from performing Buddhist chanting called smot). In a group discussion, 
this period of self-sacrifice and struggle was also narrated by two found-
ing members. However, the concluding outcome (and third part of the 
narrative in the quoted passage), i.e. the intervention of international 
donors, might be read in two ways:
• it reveals BSDA’s need to resort to external aid and BSDA’s useful-
ness to international development NGOs that seek to spend signifi-
cant sums of money on programmes in Cambodia by enrolling local 
“implementing partners” (see also Courtney 2007); or
• institutional donor support can be considered as the ultimate recog-
nition of BSDA’s important work and potential to deliver larger-scale 
programmes through the channels it created.
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In the latter of the above readings, international aid brought self-sacrifice 
to an end, allowing BSDA’s staff the moderate consumption of some of the 
economic value generated by their hard work. This could be read, from 
the point of view of Buddhist morality, as the “middle-way” between 
hedonism and suffering (asceticism)—i.e. some desires should be satis-
fied, but it is preferable to desire little (Kolm 1995: 239).
To some observers, Buddhist monks initiating SEs may typify “engaged” 
(or “socially engaged”) Buddhism—a term implying a reformist stance, as 
it also implies attending to the social and political conditions of  worldly 
suffering rather than to the mind alone (Harvey 2000: 12–13). The ori-
gins of engaged Buddhism remain contested, but a heuristic distinction 
between modernist (to which it is generally attributed) and traditional-
ist interpretations is nonetheless maintained in well-regarded scholarship 
(Queen 2003: 15). Moreover, in aid-dependent Cambodia, this distinc-
tion is pertinent because international aid to Buddhist organisations has 
been allocated exclusively to programmes based on socially engaged 
Buddhism that move in a modernist direction, in accordance with the 
 objective of strengthening civil society (Harris 2008: 212).
Traditionalists in the Cambodian sangha (the “monastic community” 
of monks and nuns, or the “Buddhist order”) tend to claim that monks 
should dis-engage from secular affairs in order to reflect properly on the 
path to enlightenment. This is countered by modernists, who express that 
one’s journey into the next life is determined by meritorious acts in the 
present life (Sreang 2008: 247). However, there is also a political dimen-
sion to the question, because the traditionalist Cambodian sangha has 
been co-opted at the highest level by political elites since the 1980s. The 
sangha discourages the participation of monks in the development of a 
civil society separate from political power, and says little or nothing about 
institutional corruption (Harris 2008: 216–20; Sreang 2008: 245–9).10 
Tellingly, BSDA’s contra-position is reflected in campaigns for account-
ability, launched through a network of affiliated monks, while founder 
members have also worked with Transparency International.
From an institutional perspective, it is clear then that influences on 
BSDA are national, transnational and multi-faceted. Whether BSDA 
attracts donor aid because of its modernist, socially engaged disposition 
or whether BSDA alertly developed this posture to attract such funding 
is not entirely clear. However, BSDA has strongly exercised agency while 
determining its strategies. The chief executive explained for instance 
that EcoSolidar was reticent when approached for funds to establish the 
SMILE restaurant. EcoSolidar was only interested in charitable work but 
was finally persuaded that an entrepreneurial approach to vocational 
training would be more holistic. Most recently, BSDA has registered its 
SEs into a formal business that allows members to hold shares. In sum-
mary, BSDA enacts legitimacy-seeking behaviour in different ways, com-
bining activities that suit the ethos of engaged Buddhist practices of care 
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for communities with a credible business model while at the same time 
(out of necessity) remaining mindful of the needs and priorities of inter-
national aid agencies.
3.4.  Findings
Religion is considered a prominent force for social development and 
entrepreneurship because it harnesses moral imperatives and pro-social 
motives (Ataide 2012; Martin et al. 2007). Motivations underlying the 
creation and operation of the SEs analysed in this chapter concur with 
this. The Loving Line Empathy Shops in South Korea are motivated by 
a religious work ethic and propagate faith as a way to promote entre-
preneurialism geared towards equitable local economic development and 
services. Similarly, Baitul Fiqh was founded on the conviction that reli-
gious guidance promotes self-reliance, in this instance as a means to chal-
lenging social stigmatisation and exclusion. BSDA puts Mettā (authentic 
loving kindness) into practice through a SE that creates the conditions for 
youth and community empowerment.
James (1993) predicts that the levels of economic development and 
government budgets, along with cultural and religious heterogeneity, 
greatly determine whether and why religious organisations get involved 
in not-for-profit education provision. In higher-income countries, con-
sumer preferences matter more, and religious heterogeneity drives com-
petition for recruiting followers. By contrast, in low-income countries, 
religious organisations are driven more by the immediate need for non-
state services than by the recruitment of followers. Based on our case 
studies, we can say that James’ hypotheses are also confirmed, to a large 
extent, in religion-driven SEs—but not entirely.
• The Loving Line Empathy Shops are a partner of the Onnuri Church, 
a megachurch in South Korea that supports social entrepreneurship 
as a way to propagate faith. This SE does not provide social ser-
vices directly but supports social entrepreneurs who do so in their 
respective neighbourhoods. It actively promotes its particular ethos 
of “community capitalism”, as a way to disseminate religious beliefs. 
This example tends to confirm James’ hypothesis that, in a higher-
income, religiously heterogeneous country, religious enterprise is 
mostly concerned with recruiting followers.
• Baitul Fiqh Welfare Home operates in Malaysia, an upper-middle-
income country with significant religious and cultural heterogeneity 
(despite the government lately promoting a Muslim national identity). 
Partially contradicting James, the drivers behind this SE are some-
what mixed. The organisation provides services that are neglected 
by the state more for ideological reasons than for economic ones, 
showing how other factors than the level of economic development 
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determine an immediate need for non-state services. The organisa-
tion is driven by the desire to promote the Muslim faith as a basis for 
well-being, but it is not competitive in outlook and it works (out of 
necessity) with non-Muslim faith-based organisations.
• In Cambodia, which was, until recently, a low-income country, 
BSDA provides vocational training, health and education services. 
Concurring with James, providing services that are neglected due to 
low public budgets has become the overriding concern as BSDA has 
grown through access to financial aid. But the priority of providing 
services does not mean that congregational support is not a raison 
d’être. Maintaining the integrity of Buddhism is integral to BSDA’s 
narrative, despite the fact that Cambodia is religiously homogenous. 
In summary, BSDA is in the business of maintaining the legitimacy 
of religion through social engagement, in a context where it has been 
damaged by repression and then co-optation, rather than competing 
for legitimacy with other religious denominations.
In the recent development of institutional logics perspectives, there 
have been calls for investigation of religious logics in relation to “inter- 
institutional systems” (constituted by markets, bureaucracies, communi-
ties, professional associations, family and Church) (Thornton et al. 2012; 
Tracey 2012). The case studies presented here also contribute to such 
investigation across different contexts.
The Loving Line Empathy Shops seek legitimacy foremost as a market 
actor. A core strategy of this SE to achieve its goals is to change the pub-
lic perception of Empathy Shops by responding to consumer preferences 
through innovative online retail, in partnership with the private sector. 
The SE uses revenues to support its social mission, but it would be incor-
rect to think that business is only a means to an end. Rather, in a way 
that reminds of the historic Protestant business ethos (Spear 2010), the 
principle of “community capitalism” implemented here states that entre-
preneurship is the explicit enactment of religious work ethic, embedded 
in good governance. This reconciliation of faith and business lets the 
Loving Line SE seek its legitimacy in the market, while maintaining legiti-
macy among supportive actors who facilitate access to resources, includ-
ing volunteers and church facilities. It is particularly interesting to note 
that, while the government provides a framework for SE accreditation, 
Loving Line declines it. It seems that the desire for autonomy outweighs 
the resources and subsidies that the state is offering. Whether this is due 
to wariness of co-optation, the desire to choose workers with compatible 
religious ethos or a conviction that subsidies are anathema to the ethos 
of “community capitalism” (and by extension to Loving Line’s religious 
ethos) is unclear. Possibly all three factors play a role. In this instance, 
religious logic is more easily reconciled with the logic of markets than 
with that of bureaucracy.
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Baitul Fiqh Welfare Home seeks legitimacy foremost as a welfare service 
provider, while religious teachings are used as a pathway to well-being. 
The existence of the commercial bakery does not mean that BFWH seeks 
legitimacy prominently in the market. Rather, from a religious perspec-
tive, independence is considered the most ethical path to social change, 
and trade allows the organisation to act in accordance with this idea. 
Baitul Fiqh’s accountability to government agencies and to the Muslim 
Religion Council shows that bureaucratic legitimacy is important, despite 
there being no significant access to resources from the mosque. Notably, 
community logic does not feature strongly (perhaps due to prominent 
bureaucratic logic) and the empowerment of individuals, rather than 
communities, is the main objective. BFWH also notably works against the 
grain of contemporary religious nationalism by partnering with organisa-
tions of other faiths. This practical approach mobilises more resources 
towards meeting its constituency’s needs, again reflecting that legitimacy 
comes foremost from professional service provision. This is commen-
surate with Ataide’s (2012) claim that “socio-religious entrepreneurs” 
put social missions first and proselytising second—thereby standing in 
contrast to secular social entrepreneurs, whose first interest is also their 
social mission but whose secondary interest tends to be impacting public 
policy (Ataide 2012: 185–6). In the case of BFWH, the freedom to pur-
sue social aims is significantly enhanced by the founder taking religious 
influences from the family rather than from the mosque. This makes the 
prominent organisational logic of Baitul Fiqh an inter-institutional blend 
of family, professional, bureaucratic and faith-driven logics, with institu-
tionalised religious logic and market logic having less prominence.
While BSDA does not compete to recruit followers, competition of 
another form has significantly driven the formation of a socially engaged 
Buddhist identity: namely competition between NGOs for international 
aid. BSDA’s more recent market orientation has intensified with formal 
business registration, but this is also reflective of the competition for 
aid, which increases the need for diversified revenues. Market legitimacy 
has been imperative for maintaining the success of the SMILE restau-
rant over time (the restaurant ranks highest among the restaurants in 
Kampong Cham on the “TripAdvisor” website). At the same time, the 
restaurant functions as a work integration enterprise, employing work-
ers from the surrounding villages, which shows that the logic of BSDA 
remains embedded in communities. Indeed, this particular logic gives 
BSDA a legitimacy that allows it to mobilise the goodwill of volunteers 
and enables the ongoing use of local school buildings for the SE’s lan-
guage school. Meanwhile, the ongoing use of the pagoda grounds for the 
dancing enterprise and for the vocational training and social programme 
delivery bear testimony to BSDA’s institutional legitimacy as a faith-based 
organisation (even though BSDA is at odds with upper echelons of the 
sangha). In summary, it seems that a holistic ethos, in accordance with 
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the principles of “right livelihood” and asceticism, which are essential to 
Buddhist economics (Mendis 1994; van Willenswaard 2015) and allow 
for the investment of resources into sustainable ventures, are the vari-
ables underpinning BSDA’s incorporation of religious logics into “inter-
institutional systems”.
Conclusion
Case studies in this chapter show how social entrepreneurship, just like 
other types of entrepreneurship, is culture-bound; as a consequence, 
universal frameworks possess only limited analytical value (Dana and 
Dana 2005). Our findings partially support James’ (1993) hypotheses 
pertaining to religious schooling in the non-profit sector. The findings 
call for nuanced understandings, taking into account a wider range of 
contextual variables than income status and religious/cultural heteroge-
neity, to understand strategies adopted by religiously motivated SEs. In 
Malaysia, a religiously diverse upper-middle-income country, the social 
goals of Baitul Fiqh appear as more important than recruiting followers. 
Furthermore, it is social conservatism, rather than public budgets, that 
determines the need for service provision. In Cambodia, while meagre 
public budgets heighten the motivation to provide services, maintain-
ing the integrity of religious faith was the primary impetus for initiating 
BSDA. Moreover, socially engaged Buddhism simultaneously enacts a 
specific religious ethos and strategies for organisational sustainability. In 
summary, BSDA’s religious identity is overdetermined by multiple inputs 
at the local, national and international levels. The Loving Line Empa-
thy Shops do give credence to James’ (1993) hypothesis pertaining to 
competition for the recruitment of followers. This enterprise guards its 
own autonomy closely, suggesting a strong desire to keep the religious 
ideals intact. Even where engagement with bureaucracy might leverage 
competitive advantages concerning outreach to a wider congregation, 
there is wariness of co-optation and dilution. This insight is important; 
it reminds of the inability of faith organisations and development agen-
cies to resolve tensions between them—an inability that precipitated a 
decline in the World Faiths Development Dialogue, after much promise 
at the start of the millennium (Haynes 2013). This is a cautionary note 
for development practitioners who would want to integrate faith-driven 
SEs into other bureaucratic institutional frameworks, although, in our 
data, Baitul Fiqh shows that there are circumstances where the reconcili-
ation of religion and bureaucracy is possible.
Notes
 1 Pro-social motives and shared values could be considered as manifestations 
of “social capital”, which has been a prevalent (although contested) part of 
the developmental discourse for more than 20 years (Fine 2001).
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 2 Mutual apprehension has since constrained these relationships and WFDD 
has retreated to becoming a small initiative based in Georgetown University, 
in the US (cf. Haynes 2013: 59–63).
 3 BAM is well known in Cambodia as “freedom businesses” that fight sexual 
trafficking and violence against women (Marshall 2012).
 4 The Onnuri Church is one of the megachurches in South Korea (a megachurch 
is a Protestant Christian church having over 2,000 people in average weekend 






 9 Prior to the Khmer Rouge period (1975–1979), there were more than 62,000 
monks in Cambodia, in 3,000 monasteries. More than 25,000 monks were 
put to death during the Khmer Rouge period, and less than 100 monks 
remained in robes by the end of it (see Harris 1999: 67; Harris 2008: 179).
 10 In the early 1980s, leaders of the defected Khmer Rouge who (with Vietnam-
ese military support) ousted the Khmer Rouge regime and who still remain in 
political power today, started reconstructing the sangha as a way of strength-
ening their legitimacy and extending patronage in order to cement their polit-
ical power (cf. Harris 2008: 193–200).
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